Tactical radios and our troops

by: General Content

Mon Aug 18, 2008 at 21:34:37 PM CDT

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Over the past 5 years, DOD investments in key tactical radios have shifted dramatically, both in size and composition. In 2002, when the JTRS program began system development, DOD planned to invest close to $3 billion in JTRS over fiscal years 2003-2007-about $1 billion to develop and test the radios and another $2 billion to start procuring them. Investment in legacy radios was expected to be relatively small and diminish almost entirely as JTRS became available. For example, the Army and Marine Corps planned to spend only about $235 million between 2003 and 2007 on legacy radios for ground vehicles and soldiers/marines. However, actual investments more than doubled and shifted away from planning to produce JTRS to producing thousands more legacy radios.

Compared with the $3.2 billion that was slated to be spent on JTRS and the Army and Marine Corps legacy radios, about $8.3 billion was actually spent. Of this, about $5.7 billion was spent on the legacy radios, while $2.5 billion was spent on JTRS development. Other than fielding an enhanced legacy handheld radio, no JTRS networking radios were produced or fielded during this time.

None. And that's a key component of the Future Combat System (FCS) that doesn't exist yet. You would think that would stop the FCS, but it hasn't. FCS is barreling down the road, money is flying out of the cab, and no one has any idea how to work the brakes.

The stopgap measures--because you can't stop equipping the troops when we're fighting two wars--are to go out and buy legacy systems--that means stocking the military with thousands of radios it intends to abandon. Not a great use of taxpayer funds.

The U.S. Army is planning by 2011 to give troops a wearable radio that can carry voice and data signals farther than current devices, uses a high-bandwidth waveform and transmits GPS location information.

Made by General Dynamics C4, the SFF-C(V)1 Handheld "rifleman's radio" is a less-expensive variant of the Joint Tactical Radio Systems Handheld Manpack Small (JTRS HMS).

It will use the high-bandwidth JTRS Soldier Radio Waveform (SRW) but will transmit only voice and data, not images and video. It will pass location information so a soldier's position will show up on vehicle-mounted blue-force tracking displays. The rifleman's radio will be a smaller cousin to a JTRS HMS variant that will transmit images and video from forward sensors such as the UGS and SUGV.

Sounds good if you're General Dynamics and you just signed the contract to provide these radios. This is the kind of technology we're talking about:

The section of FCS that deals with radios has been dramatically affected by the current wars in Iraq and Afghanistan:

The dramatic change in the size and scope of tactical radio investments over the last 5 years is due to two primary factors. First, cost, schedule, and performance problems delayed development of JTRS capabilities by several years. Second, combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have significantly increased the demand for tactical radios--a demand that could only be met by buying legacy radios. The demand was driven by a desire to equip deploying units with modern radios and a change in concept of operations that calls for more radios per unit. The resultant investment in legacy radios evolved from year to year as needs arose and was largely enabled by the availability of supplemental funding. Although a notification process was established to help manage the transition from legacy radios to JTRS, it was not effective in tracking the extent of investments in legacy radios that occurred.

If it isn't the current situation driving the rollout of JTRS, then it's the fact that there are significant problems with the technology itself--a series of design flaws and failures to meet rigid standards are jeopardizing our troops:

JTRS radios require significant amounts of memory and processing power, particularly to run the new transformational networking waveforms that will enable network-centric operations. The processing power required to run these networking waveforms rapidly consumes electric power in the radios and generates a significant amount of heat, which must be dissipated to keep the electronic components of the radio operating at a safe temperature. Dissipating heat often requires increasing the size and weight of the radio. However, keeping size, weight, and power consumption to an absolute minimum is a critical operational requirement for JTRS and particularly for the Handheld, Manpack, and Small Form Fit variants. For example, the JTRS program is attempting to develop a 2-channel handheld radio weighing no more than 3.8 pounds that is capable of running the Soldier Radio Waveform, as well as key legacy waveforms. The challenge of meeting these design constraints has prompted the program manager to identify size, weight, and thermal management as high-risk elements for the JTRS 2-channel handheld radio development. Although the recently started Airborne, Maritime, and Fixed-Station program should benefit from the system development experiences of the earlier JTRS programs, its size, weight, power, and thermal issues are currently seen as a key program risk.

JTRS radios must address stringent security architecture requirements established by the NSA and must be certified through a multistage process during their design and development.

[SNIP]

According to NSA representatives, JTRS's open networking capability has raised the bar for ensuring that its security architecture is sound.

The JPEO continues to identify security certification requirements as a significant risk element for the development of each variant of JTRS radios. For example, following the preliminary design review of the Ground Mobile Radio in July 2007, NSA informed the JPEO that certain aspects of the radio's security architecture did not meet the agency's standards. In response to these concerns, the JPEO is assessing potential design modifications to the radio and hopes to have an implementation plan in place later this year. The difficulties encountered in meeting security requirements also contributed to a significant Nunn-McCurdy unit-cost breach for the Ground Mobile Radio program that was declared in November 2007.10 The breach reflected an increase in the program acquisition unit cost of about 24 percent above the current program cost baseline established in 2002. In addition, the need to address NSA security requirements has recently delayed the Multifunctional Information Distribution System-JTRS program. Although NSA concurred with the design of the system, the program encountered difficulties in meeting the requirements for security verification testing. This contributed to a program schedule slip of almost 12 months.

Good--at least they identify and acknowledge that US combat systems and networks are going to be subjected to rigorous signals intelligence collection. By adhering to tough standards, our troops won't see the network shut down if compromised--they'll see the network sustained by its own ability to keep eavesdropping technologies out. If anyone thinks that the Russians, the Iranians, the Chinese, or virtually any moderately sophisticated organization like al Qaeda or an insurgency group like the Mahdi Army is not capable of conducting SIGINT operations against our troops, they should be willing to bet their own life on it. To protect the soldiers, you need the best technology, one that is protected by rigorous standards.

And that's why we're seeing the delays that we're seeing. These devices are falling further and further behind as the technology races ahead. No one would argue that the troops don't need the best gear--but getting them that gear has been a nightmare. Poor planning and execution are not the only culprits--a failure to anticipate the development of new and better technologies is also outstripping this program. That's the problem with procurement--just as everything is coming online, it's automatically outdated because it took five, seven, or ten years to get the finished product into the hands of enough soldiers to make a difference.

The sheer scale of this system is enough to make you want to reach for your magnifying glass--yep, that's the best I could do with the diagram. Here is the overview:

The FCS (BCT) Network is a layered system of computers and software, radios, and sensors all interconnected with each variant in the FCS (BCT). Why is this Network important? Currently, there are many radio and computer systems all using various different software. The problem with this is that makes it difficult to communicate. Good communication is very important, especially on the battlefield. The FCS Network makes this possible. The FCS Network enables leaders at all levels to see first, understand first, act first, and finish decisively. The FCS Network connects FCS platforms to the Soldier at every echelon, from Brigade to Squad. The FCS Network also gives the ability to integrate our communications with other Department of Defense Agencies and with our allies.

There are 5 layers in the FCS Network: Sensor/Platform Layer, Application Layer, Services Layer, Transport Layer, and Standards Layer. These layers provide diversity in waveform, frequency and environment to ensure there are multiple paths to transport the data. Each network is tailored to support the specific needs of the end users. Depending upon the communication configuration most users will be provided with multiple layers of access. Since the FCS communication environments are not forgiving, when a layer of communication becomes unavailable (due to increased range, obstructions, etc.) to a node the next best layer will be selected (with impacts to the performance) to support the node's connectivity. Together, these layers provide seamless delivery of information.

The network layers, as displayed visually:

The GAO concludes:

While weapon system investments are normally associated with major platforms such as aircraft and ships, DOD's investment in radios rivals the cost of some of its largest acquisition programs. As DOD looks ahead at its tactical radio investments over the next 5 years, it faces a less ambitious, yet more complicated undertaking than it did in 2003. DOD hopes to complete development and begin production of JTRS within the next few years.

Yet, this is a down sized JTRS program that initially offers less capability than originally planned. Instead of being able to phase out old legacy radios as planned, DOD now faces a much larger inventory of relatively new legacy radios and improved interim radios with much useful life left in them. Phasing out these radios will necessarily be more deliberate given the huge costs already expended and the expected high price of JTRS sets. While much of the increased investment in radios since 2003 has been ad hoc, reactionary, and enabled by large supplemental budgets, this may have been unavoidable. However, this does not mean that the next 5 years should follow suit. Rather, DOD needs to regain control over tactical radio investments so that the best mix of capabilities can be procured with a judicious expenditure of funds.

Having an investment strategy that establishes priorities, discipline, and contingency plans will be essential to making good decisions, particularly when predictability is elusive. While DOD and the services are making a series of decisions on a case-by-case basis to reconcile JTRS investments with lower-cost alternatives and relatively young legacy radio inventories, this approach could make future capabilities a product of such decisions rather than the strategic choice it should be. DOD does not have such a strategy today, and its previous migration plans and its waiver/notification process have been overtaken by events.

Do you know what happens when the DoD is "Overtaken by Events?"

The soldiers have to make the best of what they have, or go without.